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Abstract
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an analytical model of the migrant smuggling market
where smugglers are heterogeneous in terms of the capacity to exploit smug-
gled migrant labor. We examine the equilibrium number of participants and
the equilibrium average exploitation of migrant labor in the market under
the assumption that the exploitation capacity is private information. We
then conduct comparative statics to investigate the impact of anti-illegal mi-
gration measures on the equilibrium. This work thus attempts to highlight
a potential link between the ght against assisted clandestine migration and
the incidence of the abuse of illegal migrants.
There has been little analysis of the migrant smuggling market in eco-
nomics so far, even though smuggling and tra¢ cking in migrants1 have re-
1The terms, smuggling and tra¢ cking, have been used interchangeably by some re-
searchers and practioners but with clear distinction by others. A lack of consensus on
the use of the terms complicates the analysis of these activities. For instance, Salt and
Hogarth discuss this problem in Laczko and Thompson (2000: 18-23). However, recent ef-
fort to create legal instruments to ght against human smuggling and tra¢ cking has given
a clear distinction between these activities. In December 1998, the General Assembly
of the United Nations established an ad hoc committee for the purpose of setting up its
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and supplementing protocols specic
to human smuggling and tra¢ cking. As a result, the Protocol against the Smuggling
of Migrants (UN, 2000b) entered into force on 28 January 2004, while the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Tra¢ cking in Persons (UN, 2000a) did so earlier on the
Christmas day of 2003. In this paper, we closely follow these two protocols. Appendix
1 provides the relevant excerpts from these UN protocols. Our working denitions are
that a smuggler (or non-exploitative smuggler) is an agent who provides illegal border
crossing services without exploiting its clients in the post-smuggling period, while a traf-
cker (or exploitative smuggler) is an agent who also provides the same border crossing
services but with exploitation of its clients after successful smuggling. Whether exploita-
tion of migrants is involved or not is often taken as a distinguishing criterion between
tra¢ cking and smuggling, eg, Kelly and Regan (2000: 3), Salt (2000: 33-4) and Interpol
(www.interpol.int). We dene exploitation as that of labor of a smuggled client, and we
ignore for the sake of economic analysis elements of intimidation and violence that seem
often involved in both tra¢ cking and smuggling. These working denitions of ours will
become clear when we describe our analytical framework in Section 3.
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cently become one of the major international concerns.2 Friebel and Guriev
(2006) theoretically examined the interaction between migrants and smug-
gling agents. In their model, not all potential migrants are able to pay for
smuggling services upfront. A worker may therefore enter into a debt con-
tract with a smuggler if migrating and must then pay back the debt through
work in the destination. Their analysis shows, while stricter border enforce-
ment discourages both nancially constrained and unconstrained workers to
migrate illegally, better detection in the formal employment sector not only
discourages the illegal entry of the latter type but encourages that of the for-
mer, biasing the composition of illegal immigrants towards the poorer end.
In their model, while smugglers face a risk that migrants may default debt
repayments, migrants do not face a risk of being exploited by their smug-
glers.3
Dessy and Pallage (2006) theoretically argue the risk of child tra¢ cking
serves as a deterrent to parents who send their children to labor markets.
The e¤ort to reduce the incidence of child tra¢ cking therefore increases the
parental supply of child labor. Their analysis concentrates on the household
utility maximization with respect to the supply of child labor, and tra¢ ckers
are not modeled explicitly. Dessy, Mbiekop and Pallage (2005) present
2For instance, a recent report by the Global Commission on International Migration
(2005) touches on the related problems throughout the text. At the same time, its
acknowledgment section on page 88 indicates that economistscontributions to the report
were scarce.
3Guzman, Haslag and Orrenius (2002) model migrant smuggling explicitly, but their
analysis in a two-country dynamic general equilibrium framework treats smugglers as sup-
pliers of cost-saving border crossing services, and migrants do not face a risk of exploitation.
It belongs to the theoretical macroeconomic literature on illegal immigration and border
enforcement that began with Ethier (1986), Djaji´c (1987) and Bond and Chen (1987) but
does not attempt to provide microeconomic analysis of interactions between migrants and
smugglers.
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a general equilibrium model with producers who choose between the legal
sector and child tra¢ cking.4 They emphasize the importance of demand for
tra¢ cked children in inuencing the incidence of child tra¢ cking. These two
studies address the issue of abuse, but children are treated as commodities
and do not make any decision. Hence these do not cover the problem we
examine in this paper.
In the migrant smuggling market, there is no legally enforceable contract
between the providers and the consumers of the illicit services. Therefore,
migrants can neither ensure no exploitation nor compensation in the case of
exploitation. In addition, as explained in the next section, the consump-
tion of smuggling services requires a loss of the consumerscontrol over the
assets they carry with them their bodies and labor once the provision of
smuggling services is implemented. Smuggled migrants are thus vulnerable
to the abuse by smugglers.
In our model, each smugglers decision on whether it exploits its clients
after successful smuggling is endogenous in the workersexpectation of ex-
ploitation in the destination, and a weakened position of a migrant vis-a-vis
the smuggler does not necessarily result in exploitation.5 We assume smug-
glers exogenously di¤er in their capacities to exploit their clients in the desti-
nation and make two decisions at a given smuggling fee: enter the market or
not, and exploit or not if smuggling. The exploitation decision depends on
the workersexpectation of exploitation in the destination which determines
4They model a small open source country in the sense that the price per child sold
abroad is exogenously given.
5This paper thus provides a solution to one of Väyrynens (2003: 3) criticisms about
economic approaches to migrant smuggling, ie, inadequate attention paid to exploitative
aspects.
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the smuggling fee. Note that the way we endogenise the quality of a smug-
gling service is di¤erent from Kims (1985) adaptation of Akerlof (1970). In
his model, the quality of a secondhand car depends on the level of main-
tenance by the owner, and car owners exogenously di¤er in their marginal
utility gains from the car quality. A car owner chooses the level of mainte-
nance and also decides whether she/he sells or keeps the car. In this paper,
the exploitation decision of a smuggler depends on the fee that cannot be
chosen by the smuggler when exploitation capacities are private information.
We nd, when workers cannot distinguish between heterogeneous smug-
glers, the equilibrium may be characterized by adverse selection: only ex-
ploitative smugglers provide border crossing services even though workers
are willing to pay a higher fee to hire non-exploitative smugglers. In such
a case, we show that policies that reduce the number of active smuggling
agents inevitably raise the mean exploitation in the market. Policymakers
would then face a dilemma of whether to improve the welfare of smuggled
migrants or to diminish the availability of smuggling services.
We also nd that when the equilibrium is not characterized by adverse
selection, di¤erent policy instruments have di¤erent e¤ects on the number
of active smuggling agents and the mean exploitation. We will discuss a
possibility that di¤erent e¤ects may o¤set each other, making the instruments
appear ine¤ective.
In Section 2, we gather stylized facts about the migrant smuggling market
from descriptive, non-economic studies. The reason for this section is that
there has been little work on this topic in economics. However, readers who
are familiar with stylized facts about this market can skip this section.
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Section 3 presents a benchmark model where information is symmetric be-
tween smugglers and migrants. In Section 4, we assume di¤erent exploitation
capacities are private information and characterize the market equilibrium.
Section 5 investigates the impact of anti-illegal migration measures on the
equilibrium number of participants and the equilibrium average exploitation.
Section 6 concludes with policy implications.
2 Stylized facts
Several non-economic studies have made crude estimates of the scales of
smuggling and tra¢ cking in migrants, based on apprehension data, court
cases, survey questionnaires, interviews and best guesses. Salt (2003: Table
20) gathers and compares such estimated gures and suggests the annual
total number of either smuggled or tra¢ cked migrants is approximately 4
million in the world in the second half of the 1990s. According to the US
government (USDS, 2004: 23), approximately 600,000 to 800,000 persons
were tra¢ cked across international borders worldwide in 2003. Although
these gures are not comparable, the incidence of tra¢ cking appears to be
lower than that of smuggling.6
This section does not provide a thorough collection of stylized facts about
migrant smuggling and tra¢ cking but only a selection of them that are rele-
vant to our analysis.7 Note, while increasingly available surveys of smuggled
6We should remain skeptical of these estimates, for the nature of both smuggling and
tra¢ cking in migrants is clandestine. However, the UK government (IND, 2001: 75)
also expressed the same view that tra¢ cking takes place less frequently than smuggling,
concerning illegal immigration in the country. See also IOM (2002a) for Armenia and
Budapest Group (1999: 15).
7Salt and Hogarth provide a descriptive empirical literature review in Laczko and
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and tra¢ cked migrants reveal the demand side of the market, its interaction
with the supply side and the consequences, they do not inform us of much
about the supply side, ie, smugglers and tra¢ ckers. Studies of smugglers
and tra¢ ckers describe their characteristics and activities by referring to
mass media reports or quoting what was told by police o¢ cers, crime inves-
tigators, immigration o¢ cers, charity personnel and smuggled and tra¢ cked
migrants, but hardly by smugglers and tra¢ ckers themselves. This implies
that our knowledge of the supply side of the market is rather limited.
Motives for migration Existing surveys of smuggled migrants, victims
of tra¢ cking and the like indicate, although economic reasons are not the
only factors that inuence migration decision making, these seem to be the
major factors.8 They can be devided into two: economic hardship, such as
unemployment and poverty, at home countries and better economic prospects
at destination countries. The former is the so-called economic push, and the
latter the economic pull.
Economic hardship was found to be the most common reason for migra-
tion among smuggled or tra¢ cked migrants in Armenia (IOM, 2002a: 16),
Georgia (IOM, 2001: 14), Ukraine (Uehling, 2004: 90-1) and Southeastern
Europe (CTRCP, 2003).9 In Azerbaijan, Bickley (2001: 27) found the same,
but IOM (2002b: 16-7, 21) suggests both push and pull factors inuence an
individuals migration decision simultaneously. This is natural because, if
economic prospects are not thought to be any better overseas than at home,
Thompson (2000).
8Noneconomic reasons include civil wars, ethnic conicts, political prosecutions, fam-
ily/relationship problems at home, family reunions and desires for adventure.
9See also IOM (1996).
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there would not be an incentive to leave his/her country. However, there
also seem to be those whose migration decisions are inuenced purely by the
economic pull. Pieke (2002: 32) and Chin (1999: 14, referred by Skeldon,
2000b: 17) found such individuals are more common in China. L¼az¼aroiu
and Alexandru (2003: 34-7) found females with higher aspiration are more
vulnerable to tra¢ cking in Romania, suggesting the economic pull is impor-
tant.
In this paper, we take a traditional economic approach to migration de-
cision making and assume the migration decision positively depends on the
income gap between the origin and the destination. More specically, we as-
sume each worker can earn zero income at home, ie, no employment prospect
at home, while she/he is employed with certainty at the destination.10
Demand for smuggling services A number of authors have argued re-
strictive immigration policies of destination countries increase the number of
migrants who choose to resort to clandestine border crossing and smugglers
who can organize it, eg, Ghosh (1998: 148), Budapest Group (1999: 15-
6), Schloenhardt (1999: 212), Kelly and Regan (2000: 5), Skeldon (2000a),
Andreas in Kyle and Koslowski (2001: 116), Cornelius (2001: 668), Mar-
shall (2001), ILO (2002: 4), Gallagher (2002: 28), Taran and Chammartin
(2003: 5-6), Väyrynen (2003: 3) and NCIS (2003: 37), although there is no
rm statistical evidence to prove this.11 Futo and Jundl (2004: 78, 151-2,
10Accordingly, we will focus on migrants whose decisions are a¤ected by both push and
pull factors. Our analysis can be generalized by introducing a range of income levels at
home among potential migrants.
11Donato, Durand and Massey (1992: 153) found weak evidence with a small sample,
while Singer and Massey (1997: Table 4) found a signicant positive relation between the
number of US linewatch hours and the use of smugglers in Mexico. On the other hand,
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158) report recently apprehended illegal immigrants in Hungary, Turkey and
Ukraine have increasingly relied on smugglers. The UK government (IND,
2001: 76) estimates smugglers and tra¢ ckers are involved in approximately
75 percent of detected cases of illigal border crossing. Kosers (2000: 102-3)
survey found some asylum seekers in the sample turning to smugglers because
of restrictive policies against them.12,13
However, a host countrys government is unlikely to take a tolerant im-
migration policy because, while it may reduce the dependence of irregular
migrants on smuggling agents and their vulnerability to tra¢ ckers, the num-
ber of illegal immigrants is likely to increase. For instance, according to the
European Commission (2004: 9), the Belgian regularization program of 1999
that allowed illegal residents in the country to submit asylum applications
seem to have encouraged illegal immigration subsequently.
In this paper, we simply assume individuals need to hire smugglers if
they wish to migrate. We thus assume the host country has restrictive im-
migration policies so that migrating individuals cannot enter the destination
legitimately. Our analysis is limited in the sense that migrants do not choose
between illegal entries by themselves and entires arranged by smugglers.
Gathmann (2004: Table 6b) found the direct e¤ect of strengthened border enforcement
on the demand for a smuggler is little.
12See Morrison and Crosland (2001: 27-39) who explain the restrictive nature of Euro-
pean immigration policies against asylum seekers.
13Another reason to hire a smuggler might be cost minimisation. Skeldon (2000a: 9-
10) speculates that the use of smuggling services is often less costly than that of o¢ cial
channels because the latter involves a signicant amount of time and bribes. However,
bribery is rife in the process of both smuggling and tra¢ cking, and hence its costs are
likely to be included in smuggling fees.
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Charges for smuggling services Charges for smuggling services as well
as payment methods vary widely, and known gures and methods are based
on individual cases. Therefore, we do not list these here.14 However,
there appears to be a common observation in this market. Namely, non-
exploitative smugglers charge their clients for border crossing services, while
tra¢ ckers may or may not explicitly charge their prey for smuggling.15 For
instance, an IOM study of tra¢ cked women in Belgium found, while most
of them did not have to pay a fee to the tra¢ ckers, they found themselves
indebted on arrival.16
Provided the exploitation of smuggled persons at the destination is su¢ -
ciently protable, it is understandable that some tra¢ ckers need not charge
them for border crossing. In addition, tra¢ ckers are better o¤ pretending
they are non-exploitative if migrants are capable of paying for smuggling
services. In our model, tra¢ ckers can mimic the fee chargeable by non-
exploitative smugglers because the shut-down fee is lower for the former than
the latter.17 In other words, signalling is not available for the latter under
asymmetric information.
We assume migrants pay the smuggling fee only after successful border
crossing. Since there are cases where migrants must pay the smuggling fee
14IOM (2003: Table 17.21) lists ranges of smuggling fees by origin and destination. See
also Ghosh (1998: 31-2).
15Tra¢ ckers make an excuse when exploiting smuggled migrants that they became heav-
ily indebted while being smuggled, so they charge for smuggling implicitly through ex-
ploitation. In this paper, we concentrate on commercial smugglers and do not deal with
non-exploitative smugglers who do not charge migrants at all. An example is someone
who assists an asylum seeker to cross a border on a humanitarian basis.
16Referred by Ghosh (1998: 22)
17A smugglers shut-down fee is the fee at or below which it does not supply a smuggling
service and becomes inactive in the market.
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upfront, or where they pay it by instalments, our analysis is not compre-
hensive. In our model, migrants are rational: paying the fee upfront could
give a smuggler an incentive to default on the provision of border crossing
services, and the migrants should therefore condition the fee payment on suc-
cessful smuggling. According to Donato, Durand and Massey (1992: 151)
for Mexico, Içduygu and Toktas (2002: 38-9) for the Middle East and Futo
and Jandl (2004: 18) for Central and Eastern Europe, it is not uncommon
that the fee payment is made only after the client is smuggled as promised.
We also assume migrants are able to pay for the fee without being in-
debted to smugglers. Hence we do not examine the case where a migrant
enters a debt contract with a smuggler.18 This is analyzed by Friebel and
Guriev (2006) without allowing smugglers to exploit their clients.
Exploitation Migrants become vulnerable once they depart their coun-
tries of origin. They are often deprived of their true identities in the form
of passport in order to enter the destination clandestinely. Subject to legal
prosecution under the immigration laws of destination countries and devoid
of nancial means, smuggled migrants often nd their freedom of movement
severely curtailed, eg, IOM (2001: 32). Victims of tra¢ cking often become
aware that they are duped during their journeys or on arrival at the desti-
nation planned by tra¢ ckers. There are two ways of exploiting smuggled
migrants. One is by using them directly, and the other by selling them.
The sex industry can illustrate the nancial gain from the coercive use
18A nancially constrained person does not necessarily enter a debt contract with a
smuggler to nance clandestine migration if there is an alternative source of credit such
as family memberscredit. See Genicot and Senesky (2004: Tables 4 and 5) for some
empirical evidence.
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of smuggled migrants. Leskinen (2003) reports detailed gures from the
seized bookkeeping of an exposed case in which 5 to 8 Estonian females were
working as prostitutes in 5 apartments under a criminal leader of the same
nationality with Finish pimps in Helsinki in 2001. A 20-minute visit to one of
these apartments cost 300 markaa, which are divided into 200 for the pimps
and 100 for the female worker.19 The bookkeeping showed the number of
clients was about 1,000 per month, which implies the monthly revenue of
200,000 markaa to the pimps. The estimated prot to the criminal group
after deducting the costs of running the business was at least 100,000 markaa
per month, ie, almost 17,000 euros.20
Smugglers who are not employers of their clients can still exploit the mi-
grants simply by selling them. Home O¢ ce (2004: 77) for example reports
that the price of a Thai female sold to brothel organizers operating in the
United Kingdom was 6,000 pounds sterling in the case uncovered by Opera-
tion Horsley.21 The money paid to the smugglers seem to become debts that
the females are forced to repay. In such a case, they receive little money
from their work, eg, Hughes (2000: 633-4).
Females managed by exploitative smugglers can be repeatedly traded dur-
ing the smuggling process. IOM and ICMCs (2002: 7-10) report suggests,
in Yugoslavia, the existence of trading houses was identied where females
for exploitation were exhibited and purchased before border crossing, and
higher prices seem to be paid to those who bring younger females to the
19100 markaa ' 16.82 euros, according to the report.
20The extent of economic and sexual exploitation by coercive pimps might be similar
among native and migrant prostitutes. See May, Harocopos and Hough (2000) for the
British case.
21See Metropolitan Police (2003: 32) for the details of this police operation.
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market. Pobortscha (2002) suggests similar quasi-slave trading in Moldova,
and Erder and Kaska (2003: 63) in Turkey.
In our model, exploitation is dened as the use of labor without remu-
neration, thus ignoring the case where tra¢ cked migrants are sold in the
destination. Smugglers are exogenously endowed with di¤erent exploitation
capacities. As a result, not all smugglers exploit their clients, and tra¢ ckers
exploit migrants at various levels, which appears realistic, eg, IOM (2001:
33-4).
3 Benchmark
We now set up a two-country model with a xed number of identical workers
and a xed number of heterogeneous smugglers. All the workers legally reside
in one of the two countries, and we call it the home. The other country is
called the destination to which they may attempt to migrate. Economic
prospects for the workers are better in the destination than in the home in
the sense that the exogenously given earnings per unit of labor are higher in
the former than in the latter.
We assume that a worker has no means to migrate from the home to the
destination except hiring a smuggler. A smuggler is capable of delivering
such a worker from the home to the destination. Migrants would pay for
smuggling services only if border crossing were successful. With this payment
method, a smuggler cannot have an incentive to default on the provision of
smuggling services after receiving a fee, though it does not solve the incentive
problem of exploitative smugglers.
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Let us normalize the total measure of the smugglers to 1, and each of
them has the capacity of supplying 1 unit of border crossing services. That
is, it can be hired by at most one worker. The total measure of the workers
is m 1. All the agents are risk-neutral.
Let j 2 (0; 1) denote the given probability of apprehension at the border
for j 2 fM;Sg where M denotes migrant and S smuggler. Let j 2 (0; 1)
denote that of apprehension inland. We distinguish between  and , for
they usually di¤er from each other and j < j in many countries.
22 It
also becomes useful to distinguish between the probabilities for migrants and
smugglers when we conduct comparative statics. We commonly observe
M > S and M > S in the real world. Smugglers are often able to
abandon their clients in order to evade capture. Also, for example, the driver
might be apprehended at the border, but it is often di¢ cult to uncover the
whole operation and organization.23
[INSERT CHART: THE ORDER OF EVENTS]
3.1 Smugglers
We assume a smugglers decision to exploit its client depends on its capacity
to do so which determines the protability of exploitation. Exploitation
22See for instance Miller in Kyle and Koslowski (2001: Chapter 12).
23Aronowitz (2001: 169) notes forced prostitutes are likely to have more contacts with
those other than tra¢ ckers than non-sexual forced laborers. In order to minimize the risk
of apprehension, victims are often rotated geographically. Raviv and Andreani (2004)
found human tra¢ cking operations have become increasingly invisible in the Balkan region.
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of smuggled migrants in the destination requires relevant facilities to con-
duct illicit business, evade capture and restrict the freedom of the exploited.
Criminal syndicates are likely to be well endowed with such facilities.
Smugglers exogenously di¤er in their capacities to exploit their smuggled
clients in the destination. We dene exploitation as the use of labor without
remuneration. Let k 2 [0; 1] denote the given capacity of a smuggler to
exploit its migrated clients labor net of exploitation costs.
We suppose each worker is endowed with one unit of labor that can gen-
erate y > 0 in the destination. Therefore, if exploitation takes place, the
smugglers gain per migrant is ky while the clients earnings are reduced from
y to (1  k) y.
Let  (k) be a distribution function, and  (k) > 0 8 k 2 [0; 1] is the
corresponding density function. Hence  () is nondegenerate.
Suppose a smuggling operation resulted in successful border crossing.
The migrant then paid a smuggling fee, f . The smugglers expected prot
from the post-smuggling exploitation is
(1) ~ = (1  S) ky   S (f + p+ kq)
where p > 0 represents the xed penalty for smuggling and q > 0 the marginal
penalty for exploitation in pecuniary terms. The expression assumes the fee
payment by a client is seized and forfeited in the case of apprehension.24
Note, the rst term indicates, when exploitation takes place, the smuggled
24This is equivalent to assuming the total penalty is increasing in the fee received. This
innocent looking assumption is crucial when we endogenize the ratio between smugglers
and tra¢ ckers.
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migrant and the smuggler are always caught together with the apprehension
probability of S. We thus assume k takes into account the capacity to
reduce M to zero.
Let e (k) 2 f0; 1g be a binary variable that is 1 if a type-k smuggler
decides to exploit its client and 0 if it does not. We assume a smuggler
exploits its client i¤ ~ (k) > 0, ie,
(2) e (k) =
8><>: 0 if ~ (k)  01 otherwise.
Since the success of border crossing is uncertain at the pre-smuggling
stage, a smugglers total expected prot from smuggling is
(3) ^ = (1  S) (1  M) (f + e~)  Sp  c
where c > 0 denotes the sum of smuggling costs such as expenditures on
transportation, hiding places, fraudulent documents and bribes. The rst
term implies a smuggler does not face a risk of apprehension inland if it
decides not to exploit its client.25 It also assumes a smuggler must deliver
its client to the destination in order to receive the fee, f .
Let  > 0 denote the alternative prot available for each smuggler, and
we assume ^ >  is both necessary and su¢ cient for it to supply a border
crossing service.
25Commonly, apprehended illegal workers are not questioned for the purpose of tracing
the smugglers and tra¢ ckers who brought them in.
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3.2 Workers
Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor which is supplied inelastically
in either the home or the destination.26 Let y > 0 denote the earnings per
unit of labor in the destination.27 Let us normalize a workers alternative
income, ie, the earnings in the home, to zero. If apprehended, a worker is
sent back to the home without paying a penalty.28 If the apprehension takes
place at the border, the worker need not pay a smuggling fee, either.
Suppose each smugglers k is known to the workers. Suppose (1), (2) and
(3) are also known to them. The expected utility of a successfully smuggled
worker at the post-smuggling stage is
(4) ~u = (1  M) (1  eS) (1  ek) y.
Note, when a migrant is exploited, S has to be taken into account because
there is no chance to expect (1  M) (1  k) y if the smuggler and the mi-
grant are caught together during the exploitation process. We thus assume
26We thus ignore the case where a worker supplies a fraction of the labor endowment in
the home and the rest in the destination.
27We ignore the possibility of smuggled migrants being unemployed in the destination
because there appears to be high demand for illegal migrants who are usually willing
to accept lower wages than natives. See OECD (2000: Chapter 3) for an overview.
Protability of hiring unauthorized migrants is exemplied by Ghosh (1998: 77): the
convicted employers of irregular migrants in the Netherlands in 1991 made a signicant
nancial gain even after paying for penalties and out-of-court settlements. Furthermore,
Anderson and OConnell Davidson (2003: 21, 25) found some features specic to migrants
are preferred by consumers.
28This assumption may not be reasonable in some cases. Pacurar (2003) points out
that, although migrants are not subject to criminal prosecution for being the object of
smuggling, they can be prosecuted for holding fraudulent documents or/and directing the
third party to smuggle themselves. We assume throghout the paper that migrants are
not prosecuted but sent back to the home country without compensation for what the
smuggler took from them. This seems to apply to most of the cases.
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if exploitation takes place it does before a migrant can make use of any labor
being unused by the smuggler.
At the pre-migration stage, a workers expected total utility from hiring
a smuggler is
(5) u^ = (1  S) (1  M) (~u  f)
which assumes the smuggling fee, f , is paid only if border crossing is suc-
cessful. We suppose workers are not wealth-constrained in nancing assisted
clandestine migration.
We assume u^  0 is both necessary and su¢ cient for a worker to hire a
smuggler. (5) implies the following participation constraint under symmetric
complete information:
(6) f  (1  M) (1  eS) (1  ek) y
which needs to be met if a worker decides to hire a type-k smuggler.
3.3 Equilibrium
Under symmetric complete information, the workers know the exploitation
capacity of each smuggler as well as its exploitation decision rule. Accord-
ingly, (6) and m  1 imply there is a competitive equilibrium fee for each
exploitation capacity, ie,
(7) f (k) = (1  eS) (1  ek) f 
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where f   (1  M) y is the maximum fee that a worker is willing to pay for
a non-exploitative smuggling service. By substituting (7) into (1) with e = 1,
the exploitation condition, ~ (f (k) ; k) > 0, can be rewritten as follows:
(8) k > ~k  S (1  S) f
 + Sp
S (1  S) f  + (1  S) y   Sq
Therefore, we can rewrite the exploitation decision rule (2) as follows:
(2) e (k) =
8><>: 1 if k >
~k
0 otherwise
If ~k  1, or equivalently y  S
1 S (p+ q), no smuggler would exploit its
clients because k 2 [0; 1]. All the smugglers are exploitative if ~k < 0 or
equivalently y < S
1 S

q
1+S(1 M )

, ie, the denominator of ~k is negative.
Accordingly, we need y > S
1 S (p+ q) to have
~k 2 (0; 1).
For those who cannot exploit smuggled migrants protably, ie, k  ~k, the
participation constraint, ^(k  ~k) > , can be rewritten as
(9) f > f  Sp+ c+ 
(1  S) (1  M)
where f is the non-exploitative smugglers shut-down fee at or below which
it does not supply a smuggling service.
Exploitative smugglers with k > ~k may not participate in the market
because (7) suggests, the more exploitative a smuggler, the lower the fee it
can charge. Their participation constraint, ^(k > ~k) > , is equivalent to
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the following:
(10) k > k^ 
f + Sp  (1  S)2 f 
(1  S) y   Sq   (1  S)2 f 
If k^  1, or equivalently y  S
1 S (p+ q) +
f
1 S , no tra¢ cker enters the
market. All the tra¢ ckers are active if k^ < 0 or equivalently either (a)
a combination of a negative numerator and a positive denominator in the
expression for k^, ie, f+Sp < (1  S)2 f  < (1  S) y Sq or (b) that of a
positive numerator and a negative denominator, ie, f+Sp > (1  S)2 f  >
(1  S) y   Sq. In order to have k^ 2 (0; 1), we need either
(11) (1  S) y   Sq > f + Sp > (1  S)2 f 
or (1  S)2 f  > f + Sp > (1  S) y   Sq. The former implies both the
denominator and the numerator of k^ are positive, while both are negative for
the latter. Note (1  S) y Sq > f+Sp or equivalently y > S1 S (p+ q)+
f
1 S guarantees
~k 2 (0; 1). Let us assume (11) holds throughout so as to
examine the market with k^; ~k 2 (0; 1).
Assumption 1 y >
f+S(p+q)
1 S >
(1 S)2(1 M )y+Sq
1 S holds.
In addition to restricting the threshold exploitation capacities, ~k and k^,
over the open interval (0; 1), this assumption implies the following.
Lemma 1 There exists a tra¢ cker who provides a border crossing service
even without receiving a smuggling fee.
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Proof. (1), (2) and (3) suggest a tra¢ cker with k >
f+Sp
(1 S)y Sq is active
even if f = 0. Since k 2 [0; 1], such a tra¢ cker exists i¤ y > f+S(p+q)
1 S , which
is met by the rst part of Assumption 1. 
As we mentioned in Section 2, this is an important feature of the migrant
smuggling market.
Note both threshold exploitation capacities, ~k and k^, are exogenous, as
shown in (8) and (10). The relationship between ~k and k^ is ambiguous
without restrictions on the parameters in the expressions. We have the
following three possible situations under Assumption 1.
Proposition 1 The market equilibrium is characterised as follows under
symmetric complete information:
(a) (b) (c)
Environment  f < f f < f   f f   f
Nonexploitative smugglers (~k) (~k) 0
Exploitative smugglers 1  (~k) 1  (k^) 1  (k^)
Inactive smugglers 0 (k^)  (~k) (k^)
where  is a constant greater than unity.
Proof. (7) and (9) imply all the non-exploitative smugglers participate in
the market i¤ f  > f . (8) and (10) suggest all the exploitative smugglers
participate i¤ ~k > k^ , f  >  f where   S(1 S)(1 M )y+(1 S)y Sq
(1 S)[(1 S)y S(p+q)] > 1
under Assumption 1. When ~k  k^, there are (k^)   (~k) smugglers who
can exploit migrants protably but do not participate in the market, for the
smuggling cost is too high, ie, ^(k > ~k)   8 k 2 (~k; k^]. 
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In case (a), every smuggling agent supplies a border crossing service. In
case (b), there are (k^) (~k) agents who can exploit their smuggled clients
protably, which negatively a¤ects the overall prot via a reduction in their
fees under symmetric complete information so that they decide not to supply
border crossing services. As a result, modestly exploitativesmugglers, ie,
k 2 (~k; k^], do not operate. Active smugglers are either non-exploitative, ie,
k 2 [0; ~k], or highly exploitative, ie, k 2 (k^; 1].
In case (c), not only modestly exploitative but also non-exploitative
smugglers do not supply border crossing services. However, highly exploita-
tivesmugglers continue to operate, for they can prot from post-smuggling
exploitation su¢ ciently enough to o¤set their low smuggling fees. Note,
under symmetric complete information, any of these outcomes is Pareto-
e¢ cient, and each worker pays according to the observable exploitation ca-
pacity of each smuggler.
4 Asymmetric information
Let us now suppose the exploitation capacity of each smuggler is private
information. Potential migrants are then unable to distinguish between the
smugglers with di¤erent exploitation capacities. Accordingly, the smuggling
fee is determined independently of the type of the smuggler whom a migrant
hires. Because the workers are identical, every one of them forms the same
expectation of exploitation in (7), ie, there is a single smuggling fee in the
market. Let f be a function of the expected exploitation capacity denoted
by . In the previous section, we saw the threshold exploitation capacities,
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~k and k^, were exogenously determined under symmetric information. In this
section, we endogenize these in the expected exploitation via the smuggling
fee, f ().
The exploitation condition, ~ (f () ; k) > 0, can be rewritten as
(12) f () < ~f (k) 

1  S
S
y   q

k   p.
The exploitation decision of a smuggler thus depends on its k. If y > S
1 S q,
smugglers with higher exploitation capacities are more likely to decide to
exploit their clients. This is the case under Assumption 1.
Those with k at which ~f (k)  f () are non-exploitative and enter the
market i¤ f () > f , as shown in (9). That is, the participation decision of
a non-exploitative smuggler does not depend on its own type.
Those with k at which ~f (k) > f () are exploitative and enter the market
i¤ ^ (f () ; k) >  which can be rewritten as
(13) f () > f^ (k) 
f + Sp
1  S  

y   S
1  S q

k.
f^ (k) is the shut-down fee for an exploitative smuggler with capacity k. If
y > S
1 S q, more exploitative smugglers have lower shut-down fees because of
higher expected gains from exploitation in the post-smuggling period. Again,
this is the case under Assumption 1. In addition, by Lemma 1, we know
there is at least a tra¢ cker who is active but need not charge a fee.
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Lemma 2 Non-exploitative smugglers cannot use a di¤erent fee to distin-
guish themselves from exploitative smugglers.
Proof. Assumption 1 suggests df^=dk < 0 in (13), while the non-exploitative
smugglers shut-down fee is xed at f in (9). There exists at least a tra¢ cker
for whom f^ < f because f^ < f , k > S( f+p)
(1 S)y Sq 2 (0; 1) under Assumption
1, implying non-exploitative smugglers cannot use a lower-than-the-market
fee for signalling. Since (1), (2) and (3) indicate d^ (~ > 0) =df > 0, neither
can a higher-than-the-market price be used for signalling. 
This suggests there always are exploitative smugglers who are willing to
mimic any fee that non-exploitative smugglers might charge. Hence rational
workers should ignore any fee signalling by non-exploitative smugglers.
Expressions (12) and (13) can be rewritten in a way analogous to (8) and
(10) as follows:
(14) k > ~k0  Sf () + Sp
(1  S) y   Sq
and
(15) k > k^0 
f + Sp  (1  S) f ()
(1  S) y   Sq
Notice, while ~k and k^ are exogenously given in (8) and (10) under symmetric
information, ~k0 and k^0 are dependent on the workersexpectation, , via the
market fee.
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Expression (14) implies ~k0 2 (0; 1) if
1  S
S
y   p  q > f >  p,
and k^0 2 (0; 1) if
f + Sp
1  S > f >
f + S (p+ q)
1  S   y.
The rst relationship and the rst inequality in the second hold under As-
sumption 1. The second inequality in the second relationship also holds
under the same assumption if f  f . Hence we have ~k0; k^0 2 (0; 1).
Also note that (14) and (15) imply
(16) f < f (), k^0 () < ~k0 ()
which leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The total number of active smuggling agents is non-decreasing
in the fee, and the average exploitation is strictly decreasing in it.
Proof. (i) If f > f , (9) suggests all non-exploitative smugglers are active.
(16) suggests all tra¢ ckers are also active. Hence the number of active
suppliers totals to measure one. If f  f , all non-exploitative smugglers
are inactive. There are 1   (k^0) active tra¢ ckers where (15) suggests
@k^0=@f < 0. (ii) If f > f , the average exploitation capacity is
R 1
~k0 k (k) dk
where (14) suggests @~k0=@f > 0. If f  f , it is
R 1
k^0  (k) dk
 1 R 1
k^0 k (k) dk.
(15) suggests @k^0=@f < 0. Hence the denominator and the numerator are
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both strictly increasing in f . But 8k^00; k^01 2 (0; 1) with k^00 > k^01, we haveR k^00
k^01
k (k) dk <
R k^00
k^01
 (k) dk. 
The following table summarises the two possible situations:
(a) (b)
Environment f < f () f ()  f
Nonexploitative smugglers (~k0) 0
Exploitative smugglers 1  (~k0) 1  (k^0)
Inactive smugglers 0 (k^0)
Compared to the table in Proposition 1, there is no case where some tra¢ ck-
ers are inactive while non-exploitative smugglers are active. Such a case was
a possibility in the previous section because shut-down fees of modestly ex-
ploitativetra¢ ckers might be higher than non-exploitative smugglersunder
symmetric information.
Let us now characterize the market equilibrium. The set of exploitation
capacities of the smugglers who are willing to participate in the market at a
given fee is
K (f) =
8><>:k 2 [0; 1] : f >
f for k  ~k0 (f)
f > f^ (k) otherwise.
9>=>;
Since every worker believes the average exploitation capacity in the market is
, (6) and m 1 suggest each smuggler can charge for a clandestine border
crossing service
f () = (1  S) (1  ) f .
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Note, as shown in the table after Lemma 3, there is no environment where
only non-exploitative smugglers are active in the market. Therefore,  > 0,
and hence  S is present in the expression.29
As in standard adverse selection models, we dene the equilibrium as the
situation where the workersexpectation of the average exploitation capacity
equals the actual average.30 That is, we assume all the agents in the market
know the distribution of the k parameter among the smugglers, and hence the
workersbeliefs correctly reect the actual average exploitation capacity of
the smugglers who are active in the market. Accordingly,  = E [ekjk 2 K].
Denition 1 Under asymmetric information, an equilibrium is character-
ized by a pair of a smuggling fee, f , and a set, K, of exploitation capacities
being present in the market such that
(17) f  = (1  S) f  (1  )
where  = E [ekjk 2 K], and
(18) K =
8><>:k 2 [0; 1] : f
 > f for k  ~k
f  > f^ (k) otherwise
9>=>;
29For simplicity, we do not discount  S by the ratio between tra¢ ckers and smugglers.
30See for instance Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995: 439).
27
where ~k  ~k0 (f ) and, with k^  k^0 (f ),
(19)  =
8><>:
R 1
~k k (k) dk if f
 > fR 1
k^  (k) dk
 1 R 1
k^ k (k) dk otherwise.
Proposition 2 Under asymmetric information, if f   f , the market equi-
librium is characterized by adverse selection: only tra¢ ckers are active even
though each worker is willing to pay f  > f to a non-exploitative smuggler.
Proof. (9) implies all non-exploitative smugglers are inactive i¤ f   f .
(16) and (15) indicate tra¢ ckers with k > k^ are active regardless of f . By
Lemma 1, such tra¢ ckers exist under Assumption 1. 
Thus, in this market for migrant smuggling, the equilibrium might be of
adverse selection rst characterized by Akerlof (1970): all non-exploitative
smugglers are driven out of the market while migrants are willing to pay a
high fee to hire such a supplier.
The equilibrium is not necessarily unique, as in Wilson (1980). The
multiplicity depends on  (k). Rose (1993) argued multiple equilibria are
rare possibilities in this type of adverse selection model. Hence let us assume
that the capacity distribution gives a unique equilibrium. We now examine
how policy instruments would a¤ect the number of active smugglers and the
average exploitation in equilibrium.
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5 Policy implication
Using this model, let us now examine ceteris paribus e¤ects of anti-illegal
migration measures on the market equilibrium. There are two equilibrium
situations: f  > f and f   f . In the former case, all smugglers are active,
while all non-exploitative smugglers are absent in the latter. The following
proposition is for the full participation equilibrium before a policy change.
Proposition 3 When all smugglers are active in initial equilibrium, ie,
f  > f , we have the following:
(i) Improved border apprehension, either M or S, does not directly a¤ect
the average exploitation by a¤ecting exploitation decision making. However,
it may drive away all non-exploitative smugglers from the market by raising
their shut-down fee.
(ii) An increase in the penalty for migrant smuggling, p, decreases the average
exploitation. It increases both non-exploitative smugglersshut-down fee and
the equilibrium fee, and hence it is ambiguous whether it tends to drive away
all non-exploitative smugglers from the market.
(iii) An increase in the marginal penalty for exploitation, q, decreases the
average exploitation. It also maintains the full participation by increasing
the equilibrium fee.
(iv) Improved inland apprehension of smuggled migrants, M , increases the
average exploitation. It may drive away all non-exploitative smugglers from
the market by reducing the equilibrium fee.
(v) Improved inland apprehension of exploitative smugglers, S, increases the
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average exploitation if S remains su¢ ciently small:
(y+q)~k+(1 M )y(1 )+p
2(1 M )y(1 ) >
S in particular. If this condition is met, it may drive away all non-
exploitative smugglers from the market by reducing the equilibrium fee. (If
this condition is not met, the average exploitation is non-increasing in it, and
its e¤ect on the equilibrium fee is ambiguous.)
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
The intuition behind Part (i) of the proposition is that border control
does not directly a¤ect the exploitation decision making because exploita-
tion takes place after border crossing. That is, the decision is made, as-
suming successful border crossing. However, it raises the shut-down fee for
non-exploitative smugglers in (9). This also a¤ects the shut-down fees for
exploitative smugglers in (13). This increase is to compensate an increased
risk of apprehension at the border. As (16) implies, the least capable of
exploitation will exit the market rst.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition result from the fact that these mea-
sures negatively inuence the protability of migrant exploitation via (1),
and an increase in these implies a smaller number of smugglers to become
exploitative. The marginal penalty for exploitation does not a¤ect the prof-
itability of smuggling, as far as the smuggler decides not to exploit its cus-
tomer. Hence the full participation is maintained. However, the penalty for
smuggling negatively a¤ects both the protability of exploitation and smug-
gling, as (1) and (3) imply. As a result, its e¤ect on the number of active
smugglers remains ambiguous.
The intuition behind Part (iv) of the proposition is that a high probabil-
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ity of catching smuggled migrants reduces each workers expected gain from
migration. This will be reected in the equilibrium fee in (17). A fall in
f then lowers ~k, which increases the average exploitation by increasing the
ratio of exploitative to non-exploitative smugglers. Lemma 2 indicates that
the higher the exploitation capacity, the lower the shut-down fee. Hence suf-
ciently high M will drive away non-exploitative smugglers from the market.
Part (v) of the proposition suggests that the e¤ect of improved inland
apprehension of exploitative smuggers is similar to that of improved inland
apprehension of smuggled migrants, as far as the apprehension rate remains
low. If S exceeds a certain level given in the proposition as a result of
improved apprehension e¤ort, the average exploitation decreases because ~k
would then be increased. Its e¤ect on the equilibrium fee then becomes
ambiguous, and hence it is not clear whether the full participation is main-
tained.
Compared to this full participation case, we have a simple, unambiguous
result when the initial equilibrium is characterized by adverse selection, ie,
the absence of non-exploitative smugglers.
Proposition 4 When all non-exploitative smugglers exit the market in ini-
tial equilibrium, ie, f   f , the number of active exploitative smugglers is
decreasing in any of the anti-smuggling measures, while the average exploita-
tion in the market is increasing in it.
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
The implication is that, under adverse selection, policymakers face a
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dilemma of whether to reduce the average exploitation that each smuggled
migrant su¤ers from or the availability of smuggling services to potential
migrants.
6 Conclusion
This paper formalized the migrant smuggling market in which migrants face
a risk of being exploited after successful border crossing. Our model is a
variant of Akerlofs (1970) lemons framework.
The comparative statics analysis provided us with policy implications by
linking the ght against illegal migration with the risk of exploitation that
migrants face when using smuggling services.
We found that, in the market where all migrants are more or less ex-
ploited by smuggling agents (Proposition 4), policies that reduce the number
of active smuggling agents inevitably raise the average exploitation. Policy-
makers are thus likely to face a dilemma of whether to minimize the mean
exploitation of tra¢ cked migrants or to reduce the availability of smuggling
services. Accordingly, if exploitation is becoming severer than before, it
might be a byproduct of a successful reduction in the number of smuggling
activities overall.
We also found that, in the market where there are some unexploited
migrants (Proposition 3), unlike the adverse selection case, di¤erent policy
instruments do not have the same e¤ect on the average exploitation and the
number of active smugglers.
A severe marginal penalty for labor exploitation (Part iii) is a policy
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choice for those who are concerned with the welfare of smuggled migrants
because it reduces the average exploitation. Regardless of how severe it is,
an increase in the marginal penalty avoids the exit of all non-exploitative
smugglers that results in a sudden increase in the average exploitation.
A large penalty for migrant smuggling (Part ii) also reduces the average
exploitation. However, it raises both non-exploitative smugglersshut-down
fee and the equilibrium fee, and it remains ambiguous whether a large penalty
for smuggling can avoid a sudden increase in the average exploitation due to
the exit of all non-exploitative smugglers.
An improvement in border control (Parts i and ii) is not recommended
because, while it has no e¤ect on the average exploitation as far as the equi-
librium fee is higher than non-exploitative smugglersshut-down fee, it raises
the latter by increasing the risk of conducting the illicit business. Improved
border apprehension then indicates the market moves to the adverse selection
state.
Improved inland apprehension of smuggled migrants (Part iv) is not a
choice either if the welfare of smuggled migrants is important, while our
result leaves ambiguity as to the e¤ect of improve inland apprehension of
exploitative smugglers on the mean exploitation and the number of active
smugglers (Part v).
If a su¢ cient resource is available under this initially non-adverse selec-
tion equilibrium, inland apprehension of smuggled migrants (M) and border
apprehension (M and S) can be used to rst push the market to the ad-
verse selection state, and then any instrument may be used to reduce the
number of active smugglers to zero. However, such a su¢ cient resource is
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unlikely to be available.
Policymakers may also note the conicting e¤ects among the instruments.
For instance, a combination of a large marginal penalty for exploitation (q)
and a high probability of apprehending smuggled migrants inland (M) would
imply that one e¤ect is likely to o¤set the other. As a result, neither of the
instruments may appear e¤ective ex post.
The reliability of the results in this paper is limited in several aspects.
One concern is that the model assumes an exogenous distribution of the
exploitation capacity among potential suppliers of smuggling services. How-
ever, it is perceivable that this capacity would respond to the protability
of exploitation. Extending the model by endogenizing exploitation capacity
building may change the results and is left for a future study.
Another future research topic in this area is to see the equilibrium in
a dynamic setting. Descriptive evidence suggests that potential migrants
often make use of social networks in their search for reliable smugglers. On
the other hand, it also suggests that tra¢ ckers are cunning and are able to
nd victims. A study that examines an equilibrium path with information
transmission over time is suggested.
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Appendix
1. Excerpts from UN (2000a) and UN (2000b)
UN 2000b, Article 3(a) Smuggling of migrantsshall mean the procure-
ment, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a nancial or other
material benet, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of
which the person is not a national or a permanent resident;
UN 2000b, Article 3(b) Illegal entry shall mean crossing borders with-
out complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the
receiving State;
UN 2000a, Article 3(a) Tra¢ cking in persons shall mean the recruit-
ment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of ab-
duction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benets to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum,
the exploitation of the prostituion of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
UN 2000a, Article 3(b) The consent of a victim of tra¢ cking in persons to
the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph
(a) have been used;
2. Proof of Propositions 3 and 4 (comparative statics)
First, we show how the expected labor exploitation changes with respect to
a change in the threshold exploitation capacity. Second, we show how the
threshold exploitation capacity changes with respect to a change in each pol-
icy instrument. Using the obtained results, we summarize how the average
exploitation changes with respect to a change in each policy instrument. Fi-
nally, we show how the gap between the equilibrium fee and the shut-down
fee for non-exploitative smugglers changes with repect to a change in each
policy instrument because, as (16) implies, the number of active smuggling
agents depends on the equilibrium fee in relation to the shut-down fee.
41
(19) suggests d=d~k < 0 if f  > f . Otherwise, d=dk^ > 0 because
k^ 2 (0; 1) although both the denominator and the numerator of  are
decreasing in k^. That is, the size of the decrease in the numerator is smaller
than that in the denominator. Note d=d~k 2 ( 1; 0) and d=dk^ 2 (0; 1).
Let us rearrange ~k (p; q; M ; S) in (14) as follows:
F1  [(1  S) y   Sq] ~k   S (1  S) (1  M) y (1  )  Sp
= 0.
By applying the implicit function theorem to F1, we obtain the following
derivatives:
d~k
dp
=
S
@F1=@~k
d~k
dq
=
S~k

@F1=@~k
d~k
dM
=
 S (1  S) y (1  )
@F1=@~k
d~k
dS
=
(y + q) ~k + p+ (1  2S) (1  M) y (1  )
@F1=@~k
where @F1=@~k = (1  S) y
h
1 + S (1  M) (d=d~k)
i
  Sq. Note that
@F1=@~k
 > 0, (1  S) y
h
1 + S (1  M) (d=d~k)
i
> Sq ,
y >
S (1  S) (1  M) y(d=d~k) + Sq
1  S
which is the case under Assumption 1. Hence d~k=dp > 0, d~k=dq > 0
and d~k=dM < 0. The sign of d~k=dS is determined by the numerator.
d~k=dS > 0 if (y + q) ~k + p+ (1  2S) (1  M) y (1  ) > 0 or
(y + q) ~k + (1  M) y (1  ) + p
2 (1  M) y (1  ) > S.
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Let us rearrange k^ (p; q; M ; S; M ; S) in (15) as follows:
F2  Sp+ c+ 
(1  S) (1  M)
+ Sp
  (1  S)2 (1  M) y (1  )  [(1  S) y   Sq] k^
= 0.
By applying the implicit function theorem to F2, we obtain the following
derivatives:
dk^
dp
=
S= (1  S) (1  M) + S
 @F2=@k^
dk^
dq
=
S k^

 @F2=@k^
dk^
dM
=
(1  S)2 y (1  )
 @F2=@k^
dk^
dS
=
2 (1  S) (1  M) y (1  ) + (y + q) k^ + p
 @F2=@k^
dk^
dM
=
(Sp+ c+ ) = (1  S) (1  M)2
 @F2=@k^
dk^
dS
=
(p+ c+ ) = (1  S)2 (1  M)
 @F2=@k^
where @F2=@k^ = (1  S) y
h
1  (1  S) (1  M) (@=@k^)
i
 Sq. Note
that @F2=@k^ < 0, (1  S) y
h
1  (1  S) (1  M) (@=@k^)
i
> Sq ,
y >
(1  S)2 (1  M) y(@=@k^) + Sq
1  S
which is the case under Assumption 1. Hence the six total derivatives are
all positive.
To summarize the results so far, if f  > f ,
d
d~k
d~k
dp
< 0,
d
d~k
d~k
dq
< 0,
d
d~k
d~k
dM
> 0, and
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d
d~k
d~k
dS
> 0 if
(y + q) ~k + (1  M) y (1  ) + p
2 (1  M) y (1  ) > S
 0 otherwise.
If f   f ,
d
dk^
dk^
dM
> 0,
d
dk^
dk^
dS
> 0,
d
dk^
dk^
dp
> 0,
d
dk^
dk^
dq
> 0,
d
dk^
dk^
dM
> 0, and
d
dk^
dk^
dS
> 0.
We now turn to the number of active smugglers in the market. As (16)
and Lemma 3 indicate, it is dependent on the gap between the market fee
and the shut-down fee for non-exploitative suppliers. Let
D (M ; S; p; q; M ; S)  f    f
= (1  S) (1  M) y (1  )  Sp+ c+ 
(1  S) (1  M)
.
Lemma 3 implies the full participation when D > 0. The relevant threshold
capacity is ~k. We have
dD
dM
=
  (Sp+ c+ )
(1  S) (1  M)2
< 0
dD
dS
=
  (p+ c+ )
(1  S)2 (1  M)
< 0
dD
dp
=   (1  S) (1  M) yd

d~k
d~k
dp
  S
(1  S) (1  M)
dD
dq
=   (1  S) (1  M) yd

d~k
d~k
dq
> 0
dD
dM
=   (1  S) y (1  )  (1  S) (1  M) yd

d~k
d~k
dM
< 0
dD
dS
=   (1  M) y (1  )  (1  S) (1  M) yd

d~k
d~k
dS
When D  0, the relevant threshold capacity is k^. We then have all the
six derivatives negative.
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